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AA-13 "Axehead"

Date of Production 19611989
Country of Origin Russia (Former Soviet Union)
Proliferation: Algeria,Russian Angola, Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Viet Nam, YemenFederation

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Background

The Vympel K-13R-37M (NATO reporting name: AA-2X-13/AA-13 "Atoll")Arrow) is a short-range,Russian infrared homingsupersonic air-to-air missile developed by the Soviet Union. It is similar in appearance and function to the American AIM-9 Sidewinder from which it was reverse-engineered. Although it since has been replaced by more modern missiles in frontline service, it saw widespread service in many nations. The Sidewinder was quickly reverse engineered as the K-13 (also called R-3 or Object 300) and entered limited service only two years later in 1960. This was followed by the improved K-13A (R-3S, Object 310), which entered service in 1962. The R-3S was the first version to enter widespread production, in spite ofwith a very long seekerrange. settlingThe timemissile and its variants also had the names K-37, izdeliye 610 and R-VD (Ракета Высокой Дальности (Raketa-Vysokoy Dalnosty), "Very Long Range Missile"). It was developed from the R-33. It was designed to shoot down tankers, AWACS and other C4ISTAR aircraft whilst keeping the launch platform out of range of any fighters that might be protecting the target. The R-37 is now in production to equip upgraded Russian MiG-31BM interceptors. Despite the early intent to integrate the weapon on the orderFlanker family, this has yet to be reported. The R-37 was developed from the R-33. For compatibility with aircraft that did not have the MiG-31's sophisticated radar, the semi-active seeker was replaced with a variant of 22the seconds,Agat 9B-1388 active seeker; mid-body strakes enhance lift and hence range, and folding tail controls allow semi-conformal carriage on planes that are not as opposedbig as the MiG-31. According to 11Defence secondsToday, the range depends on the flight profile, from 80 nautical miles (150 km) for a direct shot to 215 nautical miles (398 km) for a cruise glide profile. According to Jane's there are two variants, the R-37 and the R-37M; the latter has a jettisonable rocket booster that increases the range to "300-400km" (160–220 nm). The R-37M designation has since been used for a modernized variant of the missile, also known as RVV-BD (Raketa Vozduh-Vozduh Bolyshoy Dalnosty, English for Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile). R-37M is hypersonic and has range exceeding 300km. It will be carried by the modernized MiG-31BM interceptors and Su-35S and Su-57 multirole fighters. It is not known if the long range air-to-air missile for the originalSu-57, version.designated Theas R-3SIzdeliye was810, seenis bya thederivative West in 1961 and given the NATO reporting name AA-2A 'Atoll'. Minimum engagement range forof the R-3S37M. isThe aboutmissile onecan kilometer.attack Alltargets K-13ranging variantsin arealtitude physicallybetween similar15–25,000 tometers. Sidewinder,Missiles sharing the 5-inch (127 mm) diameter. Subsequent examination of AA-2 missiles captured by NATO forces showed that parts from an AIM-9 couldcan be interfacedguided withsemi-actively partsor fromactively anthrough AA-2Agat and9B-1388 either combination would still work.system.

 General Characteristics
Name K-13;R-37 NATO:(AA-X-13/AA-13) AA-2 AtollMissile
Type Infrared Homing Air-to-Air Missile
Manufacturer VympelTactical Missiles Corporation
Length 2.8304.20 m
Diameter
127380 mm
Wingspan 631700 mm
Weight 90600 kg
Warhead Weight 7.460 kg
Engine solid-fuelBoost-Sustain rocketSolid engineRocket
Operational Range 1.0 to 3.5150-398 km
Maximum Speed Mach 2.55.0
Guidance System infraredInertial with mid-course update, semi-active and active radar homing
Launch Platform(s) MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-19, Sukhoi Su-17/20/22
Threat Characteristics
Rear Aspect Range 2 Nautical Miles
Front Aspect Range 3 Nautical Miles
Countermeasure Vulnerability Very HighLow
Threat Counter Tactics Discussion

The AA-2 Atoll is most dangerous when launched undetected. Counter tactics should emphasis visual lookout responsibilities and sanitization. 13

Threat Reactions

maximum performance turn in excess of 3Gs while deploying flares has a high probability of defeating this threat.

Countermeasure Employment
Exploitation Datasets