3.0 General IAD Dispositions, and Behavior

The term Integrated Air Defense System or IADS has been used to describe the aggregate of missile defense systems, command and control systems, and early warning and detection systems. The IADS are typically part of a broader Anti Access/ Area Denial strategy.  For a SEAD pilot it’s important to understand the spectrum of SAM behaviors, emission control practices, and this may fit into a larger A2/AD picture.

SAM doctrine in historic conflicts such as Vietnam can be characterized by distributed acquisition nodes, erratic data flow, and a time consuming C2 process.  Instead of an integrated air defense system this was very much a distributed air defense system with separate nets and isolated point defenses.  While targets may have been passed to individual SAM batteries from early warning systems with would have been a tenuous and time-consuming process.  It would have been far more common for SA-2 acquisition radars to be the primary means of target detection prior to being passed to fire control radars.

In later conflicts such as Iraq in 1991 SAM doctrine was completely different.  A robust C3 network and sectorized command and control enabled a sound IADs.  Instead of relying on individual battery acquisition radars, contact could be passed from EW detection radars to sector control centers which could then select the best/most efficient weapon/platform available to engage the target.  This lethal system is characterized by expedient, redundant modes of communication and timely decision making. 

As we have previously discussed, an emitter which is constantly radiating RF energy can quickly be located by a variety of collection platforms and direction finding means. A located site can be targeted and it’s for this reason modern SAM sites typically do not actively emit.  Instead, batteries will rely on broader C3 sector direction / EW information. In this manner they can stay silent only emit once a target has trespassed within lethal range.  HARM aware SAMs may elect to shut down or engage anti-radiation missiles which have been detected.  Additionally, mobile systems such as the SA-15 are likely to engage in what is commonly referred to as ‘shoot and scoot.’  Some systems are even capable of shooting on the move, further complicating the task of locating these SAM batteries.

While this section has been a gross simplification of historic and modern SAM employment, doctrine, and behaviors, with little regard for the numerous additional factors such as operator training, nation specific SOPs, track IFF filtration etc. it should provide some basic context for how one may expect SAMs to realistically behave.